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Abstract 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) provide income to the poor in an effort to improve current 
welfare and promote investment in human and social capital to prevent future deprivation. So far, 
the impact evaluation literature has focused on estimating current effects on outcomes such as 
school attendance, consumption and labor supply. However, these studies overlook potential 
redistributive effects, mainly via the equalization of opportunities. The ensuing analysis draws from 
recent contributions in the literature on opportunities and incorporates these with impact evaluation 
methods. The main findings indicate a remarkable redistributive effect of CCTs and a positive initial 
impact on opportunities. However, while mean outcomes improve markedly, the evidence suggests 
that the distribution of opportunities readjusts to the positive gains, perhaps indicating deeply rooted 
inequities. These results are expected to encourage discussion on program impact beyond those 
evaluated and addressing the programs’ long-term consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have become a standard for poverty alleviation in 
developing countries. These programs are two-tiered, since they provide income transfers which lift 
households above the poverty line coupled with incentives to invest in human and social capital to 
break the cycle of poverty. In particular, CCTs are appealing due to their targeted approach, short- 
and long-run objectives, simple benefit structure and randomized design which facilitates measuring 
their impact.  
The availability of data from CCT programs has led to extensive work on estimating the 
current (or short-run) effects of these interventions on outcomes such as consumption, education, 
health, infant mortality and time allocation1. The approaches (to name a few) have ranged from 
simple estimation of average treatment effects, addressed heterogeneous responses and spillovers to 
the non-eligible population. However, while the existing body of work has provided exhaustive 
evidence on the short-run gains from the programs, it has not evaluated its structural consequences. 
For instance, do CCTs improve opportunities for its beneficiaries? Moreover, is there hope for equal 
opportunities for future generations?  
Intuitively, if these programs improve opportunities, CCTs would contribute to creating a 
fairer society; since all differences in outcomes which stem from circumstances would disappear. In 
this scenario, the gains from the program would have mainly positive effects. However, persistent 
inequality is not easily eliminated, especially if these inequities are inherited and deeply rooted. The 
research presented here draws from this theoretical underpinning to evaluate program effects on 
opportunities, seeking to capture any evidence of structural effects of CCTs, and any other 
behavioral aspects associated with their impact.  
Nevertheless, to fully answer the above questions it is imperative to measure opportunities. 
Therefore, this paper uses recent contributions in the measurement of the distribution of 
opportunities by Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) and Barros, Molina and Saavedra (2008). This 
framework allows obtaining estimates of cross-sectional inequality of opportunities for any given 
outcome. In particular, the discussion focuses on educational opportunities due to their documented 
relationship with mobility as a channel to improve welfare (Breen and Jonsson, 2005). The main 
                                                 
1 For instance in Latin America, evaluations of CCT programs include Parker and Skoufias (2001), Gertler (2004), 
Schultz (2004) for Mexico; Cruces et al. (2008) and Cruces and Gasparini (2008) for Argentina; Bourguignon et al. (2003) 
for Brazil; Attanasio et al. (2005) for Colombia; Carrillo and Ponce (2008) for Ecuador; Larrañaga et al. (2008) for Chile; 
Jones et al. (2008) for Perú, Glewwe and Olinto (2004) for Honduras, Maluccio and Flores (2004) for Nicaragua; and 
Levy and Ohls (2007) for Jamaica.  
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outcome variable in the study is the probability of completing primary school on time for children 
aged 6-16 years. This measure is a useful proxy of schooling quality, since in an acceptable 
educational system children are able to promote each grade without difficulty or extremely low 
marks. Also, it is quite feasible to conceive that in an equal opportunity setting all children would 
have a similar probability of completing primary.  
The findings from the analysis provide insight into two aspects. The first is whether these 
policies induce an improvement in the distribution of opportunities for children. These estimates are 
analogous to existing short-run effects since they focus on the mean, although an important 
difference is that they are defined in the opportunity space instead of the outcome space. The 
second consists in evaluating whether there is equalization in the distribution of those opportunities 
or if inequality persists. However, it is important to note that while the ensuing analysis provides 
evidence on the direction and magnitude of these effects, it does not seek to explore the 
determinants of such behavior. Notwithstanding, this would present a promising line for future 
research. 
The empirical estimates are drawn from three CCT programs in Latin America2. These are: 
Mexico’s Programa de Educación, Alimentación y Salud, PROGRESA; Honduras’ second phase of the 
Programa de Asignación Familiar, PRAF-II; and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social, RPS. Longitudinal 
data is available for all cases, and each survey includes extensive information on family background 
and socioeconomic information about the respondents. All surveys are homogenized to ensure 
comparability, which highlights (dis)advantages of each particular case, and constitutes an additional 
empirical contribution of this study.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section begins by reviewing the 
literature on inequality of opportunities, highlighting its policy relevance and explaining why CCTs 
provide a unique framework to evaluate the impact of these policies on the opportunity distribution. 
Section 3 tackles the measurement issue, by presenting the estimation framework for opportunities 
and the impact evaluation methods used here. Finally, Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Latin America is one of the regions with the most countries providing CCTs in 2008 with 17 implemented programs 
(Fizbein and Schady, 2009), a coverage rate of 57 per cent. 
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2. Literature Review 
Inequality, contrary to deprivation, has been more controversial when it comes to designing 
policy. Nevertheless, a number of potential gains may be drawn from reducing inequality, especially 
that which derives from unfair sources such as gender, birthplace or negative outcomes from past 
generations. This last statement makes the direct assumption that observed inequality in outcomes 
may emanate from a variety of sources, and hence, it is essential to identify them. This section 
briefly reviews the normative literature which decomposes inequality into meritocratic and 
circumstance components. The discussion is policy-oriented, emphasizing on how a targeted 
egalitarian policy may generate a fairer society and induce a virtuous cycle of development. 
2.1 Inequality in outcomes and Inequality of opportunities 
Inequality, like welfare and deprivation, has also been studied as a multidimensional concept 
(see Savaglio, 2002, for a survey), with perhaps the most well-known strand of studies being that 
which decomposes inequality into two components: factors controlled by the individual (or effort) 
and exogenous circumstances, an approach known as (in)equality of opportunities. The seminal 
contribution in this literature is Roemer (1998), who argues that differences which derive from 
factors beyond individual control are unfair and that all differences should arise solely from 
differences in efforts3. In fact, in his definition of a totally equitable world, inequality still exists; 
however it surfaces from the effort allocation for each individual.  
The equality of opportunity approach argues that individuals should face a “level playing field” 
before deciding the amount of effort which maximizes their well-being. However, it may also be that 
effort depends on circumstances, which may explain in part why some groups are consistently 
worse-off. Hence, this approach argues that the sources of these inequalities matter, especially for 
policymaking since government efforts are directed at improving the living conditions of its 
population. Therefore, reducing inequality of opportunities seems more in line with this notion of 
social justice and fairness; while reducing meritocratic inequality does not. A simple example may 
help understand this point. 
                                                 
3 An intense philosophical debate exists with respect to fairness and inequality, which lies beyond the objectives of this 
paper and precedes purely economic evidence. See Rawls (1974), Dworkin (1981a and 1981b), Arneson (1989), LeGrand 
(1991), Thomson (1994), Phelan (2002), Sen (1992, 2000a and 2000b) and Fleurbaey (2008). 
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2.2 Equality of what? Potential policy implications of equal opportunity policies 
Imagine two scenarios of high inequality: on the one hand, consider a country where 
differences are due to family origin, gender, ethnicity or other factors which are beyond individual 
control. On the other hand, picture a country where disparities are due exclusively to varying levels 
of effort.  
In this example both countries have a high level of inequality, but the source of these 
disparities is vastly different. The first case represents a society with inequality of opportunities, 
where individuals face a certain choice set based on the circumstances they are born into and 
outcomes are solely dependent on these inherited characteristics. The second case corresponds to a 
society where inequality is merit-based, in which circumstances are not relevant and all differences in 
outcome distributions are due to differing levels of effort.  
For the society with meritocratic inequality, an egalitarian policy would reduce inequality, but it 
would eliminate differences from individual effort. In lieu with the above discussion, this would 
eliminate disparities considered fair, contradicting the view of justice on which the discussion here is 
based. For the society with unequal opportunities, equity-enhancing policies would have several 
effects. On the one hand, there is a direct effect that equalizing opportunities today by definition 
improves the outcomes of the next generation, since their outcomes are less dependent on the 
circumstances they will be born into. On the other hand, improving the distribution of opportunities 
may also serve as a catalyst for development by fostering a virtuous circle. Analog to the virtuous 
circles described in Perry et al. (2006), equal opportunities may lead to enhanced mobility, where 
efforts are encouraged since all individuals have the same opportunity set. These conditions may in 
turn enhance growth due to an increase in output and productivity. In turn, the potential gains to 
growth now have higher potential to raise individuals out of poverty and improve well-being since 
there is a more egalitarian opportunity and outcome distribution. 
This example may be more useful if framed from a starting point in which educational 
opportunities are equalized. Intuitively, if some policy improves opportunities in this dimension, this 
intervention would contribute to creating a fairer society; since all differences in schooling outcomes 
which stem from circumstances would disappear. This wider availability of opportunities is expected 
to generate a higher average level of human capital (Mejía and St. Pierre, 2008), which facilitates 
mobility (Breen and Jonsson, 2005). Finally, since education is related positively with welfare, this 
has a growth effect via wages and labor income and ultimately, on aggregate growth.  
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Both examples indicate that the main difference between egalitarian policies which equalize 
outcomes and those which equalize opportunities is mainly temporal. For instance, while the first 
may yield important short-run benefits, there is less encouragement to adopt such a policy where 
efforts are the source of differences in outcomes. In the case of an equal opportunity policy, the 
effects are expected to show in the long-run, and may have more beneficial effects on future 
generations and less so in the immediate future.  
2.3 Conditional cash transfers: Accidental equal opportunity policies? 
In recent years, there has been an increasing trend in creating development policies which 
jointly consider improving current outcomes and eradicating structural aspects of deprivation with a 
strong egalitarian component. These interventions are known as conditional cash transfers, social 
programs which provide income transfers to the poor in an effort to improve current welfare and 
promote investment in human and social capital to prevent future deprivation. This coincides quite 
well with the type of policies discussed above as equal opportunity policies. As an additional 
advantage, these programs are usually devised as randomized trials, which facilitate evaluation of 
program impact on many dimensions. In the present case, they provide a unique framework to 
assess the impact of such policies on equality of opportunities. 
In particular, a CCT program is defined by 5 aspects (Fizbein and Schady, 2009); first, they are 
targeted programs, i.e. they have a distinct beneficiary population in mind. The usual scheme 
involves geographic targeting, focusing on the poorest communities. Second, CCTs are generally 
designed to have a simple benefit structure, based on the number of children in beneficiary 
households and their age. Third, as their name indicates, these interventions transfer an amount of 
income to households conditional to fulfilling certain requirements. In most cases, these correspond 
to sending school-age children to educational centers and periodical health check-ups at local clinics. 
Fourth, implementation of a CCT requires that a specific monitoring and evaluation framework be 
set up to measure the effects of the program. Finally, implementing a CCT implies that there needs 
to be a high level of efficiency and coordination among a number of sectors –health, education, 
finance, auditing- and also across government levels –national, municipal and communal-.  
Their main objectives are: (i) reducing current poverty and (ii) promoting investment in human 
and social capital to prevent future deprivation. The first objective is clearly directed at short-term 
effects as an aid to lift individuals above the poverty line. However, the second objective seeks to 
prevent future poverty by fostering human capital accumulation; mainly in education, health and 
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nutrition. Therefore, the second objective of CCTs could be reinterpreted as indirectly aiming to 
improve opportunities in an effort to reduce vulnerability to future deprivation. 
In addition to the incorporation of opportunity concerns in their objectives, CCTs also 
provide an ideal framework to empirically assess how opportunities affect their beneficiaries. The 
randomized nature of these programs identifies treatment and control groups which are similar in 
observable and unobservable characteristics. Hence, comparison of the opportunity distributions for 
both groups simplifies estimating the effect attributable to the program. 
 
3. Methodology and estimation framework 
This section describes the methodology used to measure opportunities and how these 
techniques are employed jointly with impact evaluation methods to obtain the estimates of program 
effects on opportunities presented below. 
3.1 The Measurement of Inequality of Opportunities 
Inequality of opportunities was defined as the source of unequal outcomes which stems from 
circumstances beyond individual control. Formally, let C denote circumstances and E represent 
efforts; then a general population model for any given outcome may be written as: 
( , , )y f C E u=      (1) 
where u represents all unobservable factors. 
Roemer (1998) suggests that the vector E should include some measure of individual effort 
applicable to the outcome of interest (e.g. hours of study for education) and the vector C should 
contain variables which are completely out of individual control (e.g. gender). Both determinants 
should be uncorrelated with u. However, Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) point out that this exogeneity 
assumption allows efforts to be endogenous to circumstances. In such a case, someone’s race or 
their family background may affect the allocation of effort across the individual’s life, leading 
circumstances to affect outcomes through both direct and indirect channels. Rewriting (1) to 
incorporate this fact, then outcomes are determined by the following general model:  
[ , ( , ), ]y f C E C v u=      (2) 
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However, since inequality is a distributional characteristic, the entire distribution needs to be 
evaluated. Denote ( )F ⋅  as a standard and well-behaved cumulative distribution function. Then, 
equality of opportunities exists when ( | ) ( )F y C F y= 4, i.e. when circumstances are not relevant for 
the outcome of interest. From the above derivation, this implies that in a case of perfect equality any 
element of C has no direct effect on outcomes and no indirect effect via the decisions individuals 
make about their level of effort. Hence, all inequality comes from its meritocratic component, which 
is Roemer’s ideal case. 
So, a natural way to assess the existence of inequality of opportunity is to quantify the length 
to which ( | ) ( )F y C F y≠ . The contributions in this direction may be classified into two strains: 
those which evaluate the entire distribution and those who compute scalar-based indexes. The first 
focuses on measuring stochastic dominance in the distribution of outcomes (O’Neill, 2000; Goux 
and Maurin, 2002; and LeFranc et al., 2005, 2006), through non-parametric estimates of outcome 
distributions. This is usually implemented when the distribution being evaluated is continuous, such 
as income or consumption. However, the main caveat of this methodology is that it does not allow 
quantification of distances between groups. The second group of studies estimates inequality of 
opportunities with scalar-based indices for both continuous and dichotomous outcomes. In 
particular, this last attribute is pivotal since the outcome studied in this paper is a probability 
(dichotomous). Hence, this last approach is used in the empirical estimates. 
Inequality of opportunity for discrete outcomes may be measured by observing dissimilarity in 
access rates and measuring distances from the population mean. A visual example is useful to 
capture this notion. Figure 1 presents the estimated probability of children 13-16 of finishing 
primary school on time in PROGRESA communities by income deciles5 (baseline estimates). 
 
                                                 
4 This condition implies three additional corollaries, which are described by Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) in detail. 
5 This figure is analog to Figure 2 in Barros et al. (2009). The age cut-off of 13 years is selected since it coincides with the 
expected age by the Mexican government by which a primary degree should be achieved. 
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Figure 1. Probability of completing primary schooling on time for  
children 13-16 in PROGRESA communities 
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          Source: Own calculations on PROGRESA baseline survey 
 
As may be seen in the Figure, probabilities vary across income groups, i.e. they are unequally 
distributed. Children in households with low income are below the population mean (denoted by 
p ), while those in the upper part of the income distribution have higher probabilities than the 
mean. For the sake of argument, assume that in this example household income is exogenous to the 
child. In order for equality of opportunity to exist, these differences should not be present. In fact, 
in a totally equitable world, all children would have the same probability of completing primary on 
time. In this case, educational opportunities would have a degenerate distribution at p . 
Thus, a natural measure of inequality of opportunity is to quantify the gaps in Figure 1 in order 
to achieve this equal distribution. In a sense, this measures how segregated a particular outcome is 
with respect to a set of exogenous characteristics. The Dissimilarity Index - a widely used tool in 
sociology- quantifies these distances by adding the probability gaps in outcomes with respect to the 
mean. Therefore, it summarizes the total distance of all groups with respect to the population mean. 
Formally, the D-Index takes the following form6: 
1
1
2
m
i i
i
D p p
p
β
=
= −∑      (3) 
                                                 
6 A complete formal derivation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the complete analytical proof may be found 
in Barros, Molina and Saavedra (2008). 
p
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where the term ip p− , captures the distances with respect to the mean and iβ  are population 
weights (usually 1/ N ). For ease of interpretation, the distances are normalized to range in a closed 
[0,1] interval. The D-Index may be interpreted as the percentage of all available opportunities which 
need to be distributed from better-off groups to those that are worse-off to achieve an equal 
distribution of that particular outcome. In a situation of perfect equality of opportunities, D=0. In 
terms of Figure 1, the result indicates what fraction of opportunities must be reallocated in order to 
achieve a distribution which coincides with the horizontal line. This measure allows cross-sectional 
estimates of inequality of opportunity and through time if information is available, as well as 
computing standard errors for D7.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this indicator only accounts for dispersion in the 
opportunities in any given outcome. To fully assess the impact on opportunities (and account as 
much as possible for general equilibrium effects) it is also imperative to look at the mean. For 
instance, in Figure 1, the mean probability may improve due to a policy. However, it may be that the 
gaps remain unchanged or in the direst case, grow larger. Therefore, in order to assert a positive 
effect of programs on equality of opportunity in education requires that both the mean and the D-
Index improve. Therefore in the estimates presented in Section 4, program effects are estimated 
both on the average probability of primary completion as well as on its variability to fully 
comprehend the effects of the programs on educational opportunities. 
3.2 Impact Evaluation Methods 
For the estimation of program effects, Difference in Differences (DD) appears as the most 
well-suited estimation technique. This is due to several reasons. First, the programs were devised as 
social experiments, with randomly assigned participation offers at the village level. This research 
design guarantees that the control group (no transfer) is comparable to the treatment group (transfer 
recipients) in both observable and unobservable characteristics. For distributional characteristics, 
program effects may be calculated by subtracting the gains of the treatment group from the 
comparable control group, a simple DD exercise. For individual-level outcomes regression 
approaches are more common, since they allow controlling for otherwise unobserved individual-
level heterogeneity using linear fixed effects models and ensure that any flaw in randomization may 
be controlled if sufficient information is available.    
                                                 
7 The variance estimator for D is described in the Appendix. 
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The regression DD models used here take the following form, with ivtY  denoting the outcome 
variable of interest for individual i who lives in village v during time t. svI  is a binary variable which 
denotes if the individual resides in a treatment village. 
ivt s t ivt vt ivtY A B cX I uβ= + + + +     (4) 
As and Bt are group and time effects, respectively, Xivt is a matrix of individual covariates and ivtu  is 
an error term not correlated with any explanatory variable. The estimated effect of the program is 
β , which represents the average treatment effect (ATE). However, since program assignment (and 
not participation) is randomly allocated then the causal effect estimated in (4) is only valid for 
compliers. Hence, estimates of β  in this study are actually the Intention to Treat (ITT) effect, as 
defined by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)8.  
The estimation is carried out by OLS with individual fixed effects even though all the 
dependent variables are binary outcomes (enrollment, employment, and the probability of primary 
completion). As pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2009), these linear probability models generate 
results that do not differ substantially from probit or logit regressions. Moreover, β  in a linear 
model has a straightforward causal interpretation, unlike the same parameter in a non-linear 
specification. 
Finally, the standard errors in the estimations account for the structure of the program 
assignment. In particular, since randomization occurs at village level (v) instead of individual or 
household level (i), DD standard errors should account for potential intra-cluster correlation or the 
causal effects obtained from (4) could be potentially biased (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 
2004; and Donald and Lang, 2007). Omission of these correlations would lead to inconsistent 
standard errors and ultimately, erroneous conclusions with respect to the effects of the program. In 
what follows, two corrections are applied (as in Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani, 2009). First, serial 
correlation of outcomes is addressed by estimating cluster-robust errors, CRVE; and second, a non-
parametric alternative is also employed by block-bootstrapping CRVE errors. 
 
                                                 
8 In some cases, the difference between both parameters is negligible, e.g. PROGRESA had a 97% compliance rate. In 
this example, the local effect is almost identical to the ATE. The other programs have lower compliance rates, but not 
significantly lower than for the Mexican program. Therefore, in what follows we assume that ITT estimates approximate 
ATE relatively well. 
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4. Empirical Application 
4.1 Program description 
While most conditional cash transfer programs share many characteristics, several aspects 
remain country-specific. Therefore, before any estimates are presented, this sub-section briefly 
describes each program and highlights certain specificities in their educational components9.  
The Programa de Asignación Familiar was created by the Government of Honduras in the early 
1990s to mitigate the impact of macroeconomic adjustments on the poor and alleviate structural 
poverty. Its second phase (PRAF-II) was reorganized as a CCT designed to reach approximately 
47,000 households in the poorest regions of the country. The program incorporated both supply and 
demand incentives in its educational component. Nevertheless, only the demand side was finally 
implemented10. Hence, the estimates below correspond to the 40 randomly selected municipalities in 
which demand incentives were deployed.  
The Mexican Programa de Educación, Alimentación y Salud (PROGRESA) was first implemented 
in rural areas during 1997. Since then, the program has quickly become the benchmark CCT 
program in Latin America and the largest poverty alleviation program in Mexico11. The analysis here 
uses data from the initial rural pilot, which geographically targeted 506 villages of which 320 were 
selected to receive PROGRESA and 186 to serve as control villages. The educational component 
included demand incentives to increase primary and secondary enrollment and no supply incentives. 
The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social (RPS) conditional cash transfer began in 2000. A first 
phase consisted of a three-year pilot in two rural areas of the central region of Nicaragua (Madriz 
and Matagalpa) who had the highest poverty rates in the country. The program’s educational 
component provides demand and supply efforts to improve education in the 42 villages which were 
selected for the pilot. One half of those localities were randomly assigned to the treatment group, 
and the other half did not receive the transfer. 
In general, all three programs have a strong educational component. However, there are two 
fundamental differences. First, only RPS contains supply-side incentives since these were not 
implemented in PRAF-II and not considered in PROGRESA. Second, PRAF-II and RPS only 
                                                 
9 A more general (and extended) description of all three programs may be found in Alzúa, Cruces and Ham (2010). 
10 Glewwe and Olinto (2004) reported that this failure was due to administrative factors and other issues. 
11 The program was renamed Oportunidades after nationwide expansion. See Handa and Davis (2006) for details on this 
expansion and the evaluation of the program after the initial rural deployment. 
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encourage primary schooling while PROGRESA also focuses on secondary schooling. These 
particularities should be considered when drawing conclusions from the estimates below. 
4.2 Data 
The surveys used in this study correspond to the baseline and follow-up surveys for each 
program. The data contained in each survey is representative of the targeted communities (except 
for Mexico where it covers all villages) and includes detailed information on socioeconomic 
characteristics, circumstances and outcomes for children. The dataset is structured into panels at the 
individual level, which were processed to achieve maximum comparability between programs and 
originate in Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2009). 
Specifically, Honduras’ PRAF-II survey gathers data for 9,592 children before program 
implementation in 2000 and again two years later (2002). The survey for Mexico’s PROGRESA 
contains baseline information (1997-1998) for approximately 38,625 children across three follow-up 
time periods (Nov. 1998, Mar. 1999 and Nov. 1999). Finally, the data for Nicaragua’s RPS comprises 
a baseline (2000) and two follow-ups in 2001 and 2002, providing information for 3,131 children.    
4.3 Defining Circumstances and Outcomes 
The formal framework developed in Section 3 formally defined the vector of circumstance 
variables, denoted by C. Nonetheless, what measurable elements exist in the data that may be 
included in this set of “uncontrollable” givens? Moreover, how may we guarantee that they are 
actually exogenous?  
The first question is still subject to much debate (see Chapter 1 of Barros et al., 2009, for a 
thorough discussion), and is the first that will be answered. Since the population of interest is 
children in primary attendance age (6-16), this study defines as circumstances: (i) Ethnicity12, (ii) 
Gender, (iii) Mother’s Level of Education, (iv) Father’s Level of Education, and (v) whether the 
child is born into a single-parent household. These five characteristics are by no means exhaustive, 
but constitute a relevant subset of all potential circumstances and respond to the available 
information in all surveys. 
Previous studies have considered additional characteristics (e.g. household income, number of 
siblings and parental occupation) as exogenous. However, focus here lies on those which are 
considered as close as possible to completely beyond control of the child. For different reasons, 
                                                 
12 Ethnicity is only available in PROGRESA. 
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these three conditions may not be entirely exogenous. Income (or consumption) for example, may 
be modified during the pre-natal period to account for an additional child. Fertility decisions are also 
not considered completely given since children tend to serve as unemployed family workers from a 
young age as Schultz (2004) argues. Finally, parental occupation is not considered because on 
average, more than 90% of adults are occupied in the agricultural sector due to the targeting of each 
program. 
The answer to the second question is less evident, since there is no formal test for exogeneity. 
Some elements in this set of circumstances are hard to object, like gender or ethnicity; while the 
remaining characteristics also seem intuitively sound. It is plausible that educational outcomes of a 
child’s parents and household composition are independent from the child at birth, but once again 
this statement is not testable.  
In what follows, the circumstance variables are defined as binary indicators, with the value 1 
identifying whether the child belongs to the “least advantaged” group and 0 otherwise. For instance, 
ethnicity is zero for those belonging to the major ethnic group, and unity for the minority. Table 1 
summarizes the empirical definitions for each circumstance type and presents the percentage of 
children who belong to each category. 
The outcome variable of interest is the probability of completing primary school on time. This 
is the same as used in Barros, Molina and Saavedra (2008). This measure is a useful proxy of 
schooling quality, since in an acceptable educational system; children are able to promote each grade 
without difficulty or extremely low marks. Also, it is quite feasible to conceive that in an equal 
opportunity setting all children would have a similar probability of completing primary. Information 
on the outcome variable is available for all surveys and time periods except for PROGRESA’s 
second follow-up survey (Mar. 1999), which does not enquire about the variables needed to 
construct the estimated probabilities and is thus left out. 
The rest of the section employs the methodology outlined in Section 3 to measure the impact 
of CCTs on educational opportunities. To begin, comparable results are presented for program 
effects on enrollment and child labor by circumstance type. This analysis is included for two 
purposes. On the one hand, it provides a descriptive analysis of the programs’ effect on the 
schooling-labor choice of children. These estimates are a first approximation to assess the effect on 
opportunities by observing how this decision is affected. On the other hand, these results provide 
comparable estimates of treatment effects by circumstance type, allowing to draw conclusions on 
whether the program equalizes outcomes (i.e. favors the least advantaged group). The section 
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concludes by analyzing the initial state of inequality of opportunities and then presenting estimates 
of program impact using DD approaches.  
4.4 A baseline: program effects on the schooling-labor choice of children 
Table 2 presents baseline statistics for enrollment and child labor in each country. Means tests 
show that outcomes are significantly different when comparing circumstance groups,13 especially 
with respect to child labor. Before the programs, all five circumstances seem affect the schooling-
labor choice of children. For instance, boys work significantly more than girls, parental education 
seems to be correlated positively with school enrollment and inversely with labor status, and 
children in single-parent households are less prone to be enrolled in school. 
How did the program change this initial distribution? Program effects are estimated 
accounting for individual fixed effects on unbalanced data for each program as outlined in the 
methodological section. The models include children’s demographic characteristics such as age (and 
its square); as well as household composition variables including the number of children 0-2 and 3-5 
in the household and adults members aged 17-25, 26-39, 40-55, 56-69 and older than 70. Finally, the 
regressions also include the age of the household head. Table 3 presents DD estimates for school 
enrollment for children aged 6-16. In general, all programs show a statistically significant increase in 
overall attendance rates. Looking at results by circumstance type, enrollment increased significantly 
for disadvantaged groups (e.g. girls and children in low educated environments). Program effects on 
child labor are presented in Table 4 and show a decrease, except in Honduras where there is no 
effect. These findings coincide quite accurately with the existing empirical literature for the three 
programs, where estimates of program impact are similar or identical14. 
This evidence indicates that most programs affected the schooling-labor choice of children by 
managing to keep children in school and out of the labor market. An interesting additional fact is 
CCTs seem to have a large redistributive effect, since the evidence shows that improvements are 
more substantial for vulnerable segments of the population. Hence, these estimates indicate that 
enrollment is up and child employment is down, and more so for the least advantaged. However, 
does this shift in the schooling-labor choice of young children also impact on the distribution of 
educational opportunities (as measured by the defined outcome variable)?  
                                                 
13 Means tests are conducted via regression, with clustered standard errors at the locality level. 
14 For instance, see Glewwe and Olinto (2004) for PRAF-II; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2001), Parker and Skoufias 
(2001) and Schultz (2004) for PROGRESA; and Maluccio and Flores (2004) for RPS.  
16 
 
4.5 Inequality of Opportunities at the baseline 
As an initial approach, it would be ideal to observe how each circumstance affects 
opportunities before program implementation. Tables 5-7 presents the probability of primary school 
completion for children aged 13-16 at the baseline15. These estimates make no distinction between 
children in control or treatment villages since they correspond to pre-intervention states which, due 
to the randomized nature of each program, provide similar results16. This age bracket is selected 
since the lower bound (13 years) roughly coincides with the expected age at which children are 
assumed to have completed primary education in each country. The first column presents the 
average probability of primary completion for a child with all “favorable” circumstances, which 
constitutes the base scenario for comparison for each circumstance type. The estimates in the 
succeeding columns may be interpreted as the marginal effect in average probability from belonging 
to one of the disadvantaged groups.  
In general, the probability of primary completion varies among countries. The outstanding 
case is Mexico, where approximately 84% of children 13-16 would complete this educational level if 
they belonged to the most advantaged groups. However, the average base scenario is far less 
optimistic in Honduras (62% average probability of completion) and Nicaragua (45%). As would be 
expected, the average probability of primary completion increases as children grow older. However, 
the most important results from the tables are those that indicate the marginal effects of group 
membership.  
For instance, there is a large negative effect for children born to parents with low education in 
Honduras, signaling that educational outcomes are transmitted across generations. In particular, 
children aged 13 whose father and mother have low education show a significantly lower probability 
of completing primary (33 percentage points less). This means that for this particular child, there is 
only a 25 per cent chance of completing the basic educational level. In Mexico, the circumstances 
with significant effects are ethnicity, gender and mother’s level of education. Compared to the base 
scenario, an indigenous boy born to a low educated mother is 12 percentage points less likely to 
finish primary. Finally, the relevant circumstances in Nicaragua include gender and parental 
education. Once again, a worst-case scenario sees a 13-year old boy born into a low education 
environment with a pessimistic 6 percent probability of finishing his primary studies on time.  
                                                 
15 Results for Logit models are presented. LPM estimates were also calculated and are available from the author upon 
request. The differences between both estimations are negligible, with the Logit specification being favored because it 
allows the descriptive simulations in Tables 5-7 by age of the child. 
16 These results are available upon request.  
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These average probabilities are complemented with baseline estimates of the D-Index in Table 
8. In the baseline period, to equate educational opportunities, 62% of opportunities needed to be 
redistributed in PRAF-II villages. This figure is 51% in PROGRESA and 69 percent in RPS. This 
evidence indicates that before the start of the program, inequality of opportunity exists and seems to 
be highly important. Moreover, the findings show the grim state in the targeted villages in each 
country which is not surprising since these localities were selected due to their high poverty rate. 
However this leads to the natural question, how does a CCT program affect this initial level of 
inequity? 
4.6 Program effects on Inequality of Opportunities 
A first approach to this answer is also suggested in Table 8, which shows trends in both the 
mean and the variability of opportunities. The evidence indicates heterogeneous behavior when 
comparing each program. For instance, after exposure to PRAF-II there is a mild increase in access, 
but virtually no change in inequality of opportunities. PROGRESA and RPS villages show more 
pronounced improvements, although their behavior is somewhat different. For instance, 
PROGRESA seems to improve access and opportunities only during the first period. However, the 
table indicates that during the second year, there is no improvement and in fact shows a worsening 
of the distribution of opportunities. In turn, RPS continually improves access rates; and the D-Index 
behaves in a similar fashion than the Mexican program. However, while illustrative, these 
calculations do not isolate the effect attributable to the programs. For this purpose, impact 
evaluation methods are required.  
First, estimates for the effect on the mean are presented in Table 9. The estimation procedure 
is the same as for the enrollment and child labor results, with program effects estimated using fixed-
effects linear regressions. The results confirm the trends from the prior table. On the one hand, 
there is no evidence of effects on mean opportunities in PRAF-II villages and positive effects in 
PROGRESA and RPS villages. On the other hand, there are clear differences between these two 
cases where opportunities improve. In particular, there is evidence of a continual increase due to the 
Nicaraguan program, while the increase in PROGRESA is only found in the first period and is small 
in magnitude. However, this is only one of the two conditions required to assert whether the 
distribution of opportunities is improved since this greater access needs to be fairly distributed.  
Table 10 presents a difference in differences exercise for the D-Index which isolates the effect 
of the program on the variance of opportunities by comparing the opportunity distribution of 
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children exposed to the program and those residing in control villages. Once again, there is no 
evidence of an effect in PRAF-II villages. In this case however, RPS shows no indication of an 
improvement in the distribution of opportunities. Hence, while the access increases, inequality in 
educational opportunities remains. However, the most interesting finding comes from the estimates 
for PROGRESA children. The change in the D-Index attributable to PROGRESA shows that the 
first period reduction was highly significant and negative (denoting an immediate and overall 
improvement in opportunities since mean outcomes also improved). However, this initial gain does 
not hold according to the evidence. In fact, after the first year, opportunities stagnate and their 
distribution seems to worsen. This shift in the distribution may indicate that the program has an 
impact on opportunities, but that there is another effect which compensates this initial 
redistribution. 
Therefore, these findings provide a first insight into the redistributive consequences of CCT 
programs on opportunities by showing that there are intricate mechanisms at work after 
interventions. On the one hand, the average level of opportunities seems to be affected positively by 
the programs demand-centered incentives (and more so when supply-side factors are also included). 
However, with respect to the distribution of those opportunities, the estimates indicate that positive 
gains are likely but temporary. The evidence for PROGRESA, the gold standard of CCTs shows 
that there is evidence of a readjustment of opportunity distributions to counter these gains. This may 
be a first indication of mechanisms such as inequality traps in action, where sources of persistent 
inequality maintain an inequitable distribution despite improved average outcomes. These 
mechanisms and their implications for social policies are surely to be an interesting topic for future 
research and public policy debate; since they may shed light on important mechanisms to foster 
virtuous cycles of growth-equality and poverty reduction. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper studied the effect of CCT programs on educational opportunities. Until now, the 
existing body of work has provided exhaustive evidence on the short-run gains from the programs, 
and has omitted evaluation of more structural consequences, such as the effect on opportunities. 
This paper uses recent contributions in the measurement of the distribution of opportunities to 
overcome this gap in the literature and in order to encourage discussion on the structural effects of 
such interventions, especially with respect to opportunities. 
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In summary, there are three main findings in this paper: first, there are important differences 
in program effects between circumstance types. CCT programs seem to have a strong effect on 
mean outcomes which favors disadvantaged groups. This is especially true for child labor and less so 
in enrollment, where the effect was relatively widespread across groups. Second, there is evidence of 
a positive effect of conditional cash transfers on educational opportunities in the short-run. 
However, this leads to the third finding, that although the effect on the mean is positive, there is no 
indication of an improvement in the distribution of those opportunities. In fact, in the case of 
PROGRESA, the initial positive gains are compensated by another effect, which restores the initial 
unequal setting and may be associated with structural inequality. 
Certainly, there are a number of reasons which may explain the behavior found here. 
Distributional changes in opportunities are much more complex than for standard outcomes, and 
while this paper takes a first step in analyzing the structural consequences of CCT programs by 
quantifying program effects, there is still much work to be carried out. In particular, a detailed 
analysis of the channels which cause the positive impact and their long-run implications on 
beneficiaries is most welcome, as well as other contributions in both theoretical and empirical fields 
to seek explanation for these results. Also, this paper looks at medium term outcomes, which may 
limit the capabilities of the above methodology to capture effects further down the line.  
Nevertheless, as a first exercise, the work presented here outlines a possible starting point these 
extensions and hopefully greater interest in the structural consequences of conditional cash transfers, 
and on concepts such as opportunities, where it is necessary to observe both mean outcomes and 
their variance. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Proportion of children 6-16 in each circumstance type 
Circumstance Types Defined as PRAF-II PROGRESA RPS
All Population
Ethnic Group
   Majority White/Mestizo n.a. 70.2 n.a.
   Minority Indigenous/Native n.a. 29.8 n.a.
Gender
   Male Male 50.9 51.2 50.1
   Female Female 49.1 48.8 49.9
Mother's Education
   High Primary Complete or Higher 16.9 32.3 10.7
   Low Less than Primary Complete 83.1 67.7 89.3
Father's Education
   High Primary Complete or Higher 17.9 30.7 8.2
   Low Less than Primary Complete 82.1 69.3 91.8
Household Type
   Both parents
If both father and mother are 
present 81.8 89.5 85.3
   Single-Parent
If only one of the parents is 
present 18.2 10.5 14.7  
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not available 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Circumstance Type (children 6-16) 
Enrolled Working Enrolled Working Enrolled Working
All 74.4 60.5 82.8 14.0 62.5 17.1
By Circumstance
Ethnic Group
   Minority n.a. n.a. 85.9 12.4 n.a. n.a.
   Majority n.a. n.a. 81.5 14.6 n.a. n.a.
     Difference 4.4*** -2.2**
Gender
   Female 75.7 33.8 81.3 7.4 63.4 5.7
   Male 73.1 73.4 84.2 20.1 61.5 28.4
     Difference 2.6** -39.6*** -2.9*** -12.7*** 1.9 -22.7***
Mother's Education
   Low 72.7 61.2 82.9 13.9 60.4 17.7
   High 85.0 60.1 90.3 9.2 81.2 14.7
     Difference -12.3*** 1.1 -7.5*** 4.7*** -20.8*** 3.0
Father's Education
   Low 72.1 61.3 82.5 13.9 62.5 17.1
   High 90.1 42.0 90.7 8.5 77.9 11.5
     Difference -18.0*** 19.4*** -8.2*** 5.4*** -15.5*** 5.6**
Household Type
   Both parents 71.4 63.5 79.5 17.0 58.6 20.5
   Single-Parent 75.0 59.8 83.2 13.6 63.1 16.6
     Difference -3.6** 3.7 -3.6*** 3.4*** -4.5* 3.9**
RPSPRAF-II PROGRESA
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not available 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
24 
 
Table 3 
Program effects on enrollment (children 6-16), by circumstance type 
All
Majority Minority Boys Girls High Low High Low Both Parents Single Parent
ITT (May-Aug. 2002) 0.024 n.a. n.a. -0.004 0.056 0.080 0.012 -0.025 0.020 0.020 0.037
PRAF-II Clustered (0.017) (0.026) (0.018)*** (0.037)** (0.021) (0.044) (0.022) (0.018) (0.037)
Baseline: Bootstrapped (0.016) (0.029) (0.018)*** (0.036)** (0.021) (0.046) (0.024) (0.019) (0.037)
   Aug-Dec. 2000
Observations 9,620 4,861 4,759 1,342 7,039 1,250 5,758 7,750 1,870
Groups 6,004 3,018 3,001 941 4,518 849 3,703 4,930 1,279
ITT (Nov. 1998) 0.028 0.028 0.047 0.032 0.030 0.022 0.034 0.020 0.027 0.028 0.030
Clustered (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.015)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.012)* (0.010)*** (0.014) (0.011)** (0.005)*** (0.013)**
Bootstrapped (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.012)* (0.010)*** (0.013) (0.011)** (0.005)*** (0.012)**
ITT (Mar. 1999) 0.030 0.029 0.042 0.029 0.034 0.009 0.033 0.028 0.020 0.030 0.028
PROGRESA Clustered (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.013) (0.011)*** (0.015)* (0.011)* (0.006)*** (0.016)*
Baseline: Bootstrapped (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.013) (0.011)*** (0.014)** (0.011)* (0.006)*** (0.017)*
   Sept.1997-Mar. 1998
ITT (Nov. 1999) 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.041 0.021 0.035 0.023 0.043 0.034 0.029
Clustered (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.016)* (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.015) (0.012)*** (0.016) (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)*
Bootstrapped (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.017)* (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.016) (0.012)*** (0.016) (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)*
Observations 146,059 85,612 37,984 72,485 70,958 29,639 45,491 25,245 43,584 131,663 14,396
Groups 49,427 42,070 26,810 39,972 39,715 22,890 31,388 20,348 30,816 44,275 5,450
ITT (Oct. 2001) 0.180 n.a. n.a. 0.186 0.174 0.055 0.188 0.062 0.167 0.170 0.267
Clustered (0.042)*** (0.047)*** (0.044)*** (0.072) (0.045)*** (0.056) (0.045)*** (0.042)*** (0.065)***
Bootstrapped (0.044)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.077) (0.044)*** (0.066) (0.047)*** (0.039)*** (0.067)***
RPS
Baseline: ITT (Oct. 2002) 0.144 n.a. n.a. 0.148 0.138 0.034 0.155 0.006 0.126 0.136 0.205
   Aug.-Sept. 2000 Clustered (0.047)*** (0.053)*** (0.049)*** (0.077) (0.050)*** (0.091) (0.049)** (0.047)*** (0.079)**
Bootstrapped (0.050)*** (0.054)*** (0.048)*** (0.082) (0.051)*** (0.094) (0.051)** (0.043)*** (0.080)**
Observations 8,318 4,202 4,116 779 6,885 506 6,139 7,268 1,050
Groups 3,542 1,768 1,774 363 2,947 236 2,594 3,089 453
Ethnicity Gender Mother's Education Father's Education Household Type
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not available 
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at village level. 
250 replications for bootstrapped errors 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 4 
Program effects on child labor (children 6-16), by circumstance type 
All
Majority Minority Boys Girls High Low High Low Both Parents Single Parent
ITT (May-Aug. 2002) 0.091 n.a. n.a. 0.067 0.205 0.024 0.090 -0.157 0.111 0.091 0.137
PRAF-II Clustered (0.057) (0.062) (0.113)* (0.130) (0.065) (0.115) (0.073) (0.062) (0.091)
Baseline: Bootstrapped (0.059) (0.067) (0.126) (0.190) (0.069) (0.135) (0.074) (0.062) (0.106)
   Aug-Dec. 2000
Observations 4,248 2,799 1,449 416 3,289 423 2,647 3,393 855
Groups 3,258 2,028 1,231 372 2,512 361 2,027 2,623 688
ITT (Nov. 1998) -0.029 -0.032 -0.014 -0.032 -0.011 0.013 -0.028 0.033 -0.042 -0.029 -0.026
Clustered (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.023) (0.014)** (0.010) (0.022) (0.015)* (0.023) (0.016)*** (0.010)*** (0.021)
Bootstrapped (0.010)*** (0.013)** (0.023) (0.013)** (0.011) (0.021) (0.014)** (0.023) (0.016)*** (0.010)*** (0.021)
ITT (Mar. 1999) -0.028 -0.034 -0.018 -0.042 -0.008 -0.007 -0.037 0.010 -0.047 -0.026 -0.048
PROGRESA Clustered (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.024) (0.014)*** (0.009) (0.018) (0.015)** (0.021) (0.015)*** (0.009)*** (0.022)**
Baseline: Bootstrapped (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.024) (0.014)*** (0.009) (0.018) (0.014)*** (0.023) (0.015)*** (0.009)*** (0.021)**
   Sept.1997-Mar. 1998
ITT (Nov. 1999) -0.030 -0.035 -0.002 -0.042 -0.008 -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.048 -0.032 -0.018
Clustered (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.031) (0.015)*** (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.022)
Bootstrapped (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.032) (0.014)*** (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.022)
Observations 120,492 70,528 31,511 59,906 58,380 23,975 37,336 20,221 35,839 108,101 12,391
Groups 41,882 35,393 22,399 33,556 33,215 18,685 26,097 16,442 25,676 37,365 4,750
ITT (Oct. 2001) -0.068 n.a. n.a. -0.093 -0.043 -0.031 -0.071 0.023 -0.062 -0.063 -0.092
Clustered (0.024)*** (0.036)** (0.022)* (0.050) (0.028)** (0.067) (0.029)** (0.024)** (0.043)**
Bootstrapped (0.024)*** (0.034)*** (0.023)* (0.049) (0.030)** (0.066) (0.027)** (0.023)*** (0.045)**
RPS
Baseline: ITT (Oct. 2002) -0.081 n.a. n.a. -0.102 -0.062 -0.051 -0.085 0.013 -0.075 -0.081 -0.067
   Aug.-Sept. 2000 Clustered (0.032)** (0.043)** (0.029)** (0.050) (0.037)** (0.073) (0.035)** (0.032)** (0.063)
Bootstrapped (0.033)** (0.045)** (0.029)** (0.052) (0.037)** (0.077) (0.034)** (0.031)*** (0.067)
Observations 8,205 4,160 4,045 769 6,789 502 6,052 7,166 1,039
Groups 3,506 1,746 1,760 360 2,916 236 2,563 3,055 451
Ethnicity Gender Mother's Education Father's Education Household Type
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not available 
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at village level. 
250 replications for bootstrapped errors 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Predicted probabilities of completing primary on time (children 13-16), PRAF-II 
Base Scenario
Age
Ethnic 
Minority Female
Mother's 
Education Low
Father's 
Education Low Household Type
13 0.586 n.a. 0.036 -0.148 -0.182 -0.323
(0.030) (0.040)*** (0.052)*** (0.228)
14 0.572 n.a. 0.036 -0.148 -0.181 -0.320
(0.030) (0.040)*** (0.053)*** (0.225)
15 0.693 n.a. 0.031 -0.139 -0.173 -0.331
(0.027) (0.040)*** (0.049)*** (0.271)
16 0.643 n.a. 0.034 -0.145 -0.180 -0.331
(0.028) (0.039)*** (0.052)*** (0.252)
PRAF-II
Marginal Effect by Circumstance Type
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not Available 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are estimated by Logit pooling treated and control children. Controls include 4 age levels (13-16), log household 
consumption, number of children in the household and the circumstance vector. Heteroskedasticity robust CRVE standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
Table 6 
Predicted probabilities of completing primary on time (children 13-16), PROGRESA 
Base Scenario
Age
Ethnic 
Minority Female
Mother's 
Education Low
Father's 
Education Low Household Type
13 0.740 -0.043 0.044 -0.036 -0.018 0.027
(0.018)*** (0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.012) (0.030)
14 0.834 -0.031 0.031 -0.026 -0.013 0.020
(0.013)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.008) (0.021)
15 0.883 -0.024 0.023 -0.020 -0.010 0.014
(0.010)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.006) (0.016)
16 0.893 -0.022 0.021 -0.019 -0.009 0.013
(0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006) (0.014)
PROGRESA
Marginal Effect by Circumstance Type
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not Available 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are estimated by Logit pooling treated and control children. Controls include 4 age levels (13-16), log household 
consumption, number of children in the household and the circumstance vector. Heteroskedasticity robust CRVE standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
Table 7 
Predicted probabilities of completing primary on time (children 13-16), RPS 
Base Scenario
Age
Ethnic 
Minority Female
Mother's 
Education Low
Father's 
Education Low Household Type
13 0.253 n.a. 0.090 -0.154 -0.125 -0.045
(0.045)** (0.069)*** (0.058)*** (0.159)
14 0.362 n.a. 0.105 -0.207 -0.165 -0.056
(0.054)** (0.090)*** (0.070)*** (0.207)
15 0.554 n.a. 0.103 -0.267 -0.205 -0.063
(0.056)** (0.099)*** (0.078)*** (0.246)
16 0.629 n.a. 0.094 -0.274 -0.206 -0.060
(0.054)** (0.101)*** (0.077)*** (0.242)
RPS
Marginal Effect by Circumstance Type
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not Available 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are estimated by Logit pooling treated and control children. Controls include 4 age levels (13-16), log household 
consumption, number of children in the household and the circumstance vector. Heteroskedasticity robust CRVE standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Trends in inequality of opportunity (children 6-16) 
Coverage D-Index Coverage D-Index Coverage D-Index
t=0 0.126 0.607 0.311 0.509 0.059 0.666
(0.005) (0.075) (0.002) (0.021) (0.005) (0.094)
t=1 0.131 0.606 0.339 0.437 0.050 0.609
(0.005) (0.079) (0.004) (0.028) (0.005) (0.148)
t=2 0.339 0.468 0.073 0.619
(0.003) (0.026) (0.005) (0.088)
PRAF-II PROGRESA RPS
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
 
Table 9 
Program effects on the probability of completing primary on time 
All Children Children 13-16
ITT (May-Aug. 2002) 0.002 -0.002
PRAF-II Clustered (0.005) (0.009)
Baseline: Bootstrapped (0.006) (0.009)
   Aug-Dec. 2000 Observations 7,422 2,222
ITT (Nov. 1998) 0.006 0.010
Clustered (0.006) (0.004)**
Bootstrapped (0.006) (0.004)**
PROGRESA
Baseline: ITT (Nov. 1999) 0.010 0.004
   Sept.1997-Mar. 1998 Clustered (0.007) (0.005)
Bootstrapped (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 37,507 12,549
ITT (Oct. 2001) 0.014 0.037
Clustered (0.004)*** (0.010)***
RPS Bootstrapped (0.004)*** (0.011)***
Baseline:
   Aug.-Sept. 2000 ITT (Oct. 2002) 0.016 0.041
Clustered (0.008)* (0.018)**
Bootstrapped (0.009)* (0.018)**
Observations 6,273 2,086  
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at village level. 
250 replications for bootstrapped errors.  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 10 
Program effects on inequality of educational opportunities (children 6-16) 
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
t=0 0.614 0.627 -0.013 0.509 0.509 0.000 0.677 0.766 -0.089
(0.053) (0.044) (0.069) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.071) (0.128) (0.146)
t=1 0.608 0.645 -0.036 0.427 0.455 -0.028 0.639 0.689 -0.049
(0.029) (0.035) (0.046) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.120) (0.139) (0.184)
t=2 0.473 0.458 0.015 0.601 0.671 -0.070
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.104) (0.100) (0.144)
Diff-In-Diff Period 1 -0.023 -0.028 0.040
(0.083) (0.011)*** (0.235)
Period 2 0.043 -0.021
(0.012)*** (0.234)
PRAF-II PROGRESA RPS
 
Source: Own calculations on Program Surveys 
n.a.-Not Available 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Appendix 
 
Variance Estimator for the D-Index 
 
The D-Index is actually a ratio of two linear functions of the predicted probabilities ( ˆ ip ), for those 
below mean access, ˆ{ : }iL i p p= ≤ , and those who are above the population mean, 
ˆ{ : }iU i p p= > . 
 
The variance estimator of ˆD  used in this paper is a sandwich-type estimator, 2 βσ ′= ΓΩ Γ , 
calculated using the following formula: 
 
2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )i i i i i i i i i i i i
i L i U i U i L
w p w p p x w p w p p x
p ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
          Γ = ⋅ − − ⋅ −          
          
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
 
 
